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PQC migration - do you know where your risk sits?

Your organization's encryption dependencies are invisible - until they become a regulatory liability.

We make them visible.

The Challenge

Three Critical Challenges Facing Enterprise Now

For CISOs and security leaders, the path to post-quantum readiness begins with confronting these realities.

🛡️

Hidden Cryptographic Risk

Most businesses cannot identify where quantum-vulnerable encryption exists across their estate. Legacy systems, third-party integrations, and shadow IT create blind spots that manual audits consistently miss.

👁️

Zero Visibility into Crypto Dependencies

Without a structured cryptographic inventory, security teams lack the evidence base needed to assess exposure, prioritise remediation, or satisfy regulatory requirements around post-quantum readiness.

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Migration Without a Starting Point

Post-quantum migration demands a clear baseline. Organizations that begin without comprehensive discovery face delays, cost overruns, and the risk of leaving critical systems unprotected.

The Regulatory Compliance Mandate

  • EU
  • UK
  • US
  • Canada
  • Australia
  • New Zealand
  • Singapore

DORA & NIS2

DORA requires financial entities to maintain an ICT risk management framework, including asset registers, dependency mapping, third‑party oversight, testing (e.g. TLPT), and incident reporting.

NIS2 raises baseline cybersecurity obligations across sectors, with national enforcement following member‑state transposition in late 2024.

2026: EU member states adopt national post-quantum cryptography strategies.

2030: Priority systems in the EU must migrate from vulnerable algorithms.

Additional legislation is anticipated.
 

NCSC

  • By 2028: carry out a full discovery exercise to understand where cryptography is used, define migration goals, and build an initial plan
  • By 2031: complete early, high‑priority PQC migrations
  • By 2035: complete migration across systems, services, and products

OMB, CISA & NIST

Executive Orders:

  • 14028 - Requires zero trust and software bills of materials

  • 14144 - Highlights the risks of quantum computers to break current cryptography and instructs Federal agencies to begin an inventory of cryptographic systems

  • 14306 - Re-instructs the guidance in 14144 and emphasizes the importance of preparing for Post Quantum Cryptography

White House Cyber Strategy for America

March 6, 2026 - Prioritizes post-quantum Cryptography across multiple pillars 

Law:

Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act (Public Law 117‑260) - Legal requirement from Congress to plan for and migrate to Post Quantum Cryptography

OMB:

M-23-02 - Requires a prioritized inventory of cryptographic systems, identification of quantum-vulnerable cryptography and annual reporting by agency

CISA:

Strategy for Migrating Automated PQC Discovery & Inventory Tools - Published guidelines on buying products capable of PQC and how to buy Automated Cryptography Discovery and Inventory tools

  • 2030: Priority systems in the US must migrate from vulnerable algorithms
  • 2035: Broad global adoption of quantum-safe cryptography
  • Additional legislation is anticipated in all jurisdictions

OSFI (banks & insurers) and Bank of Canada (payments)

OSFI Guideline B‑13 sets expectations for technology and cyber risk management, emphasising governance, asset visibility, third‑party assurance, and operational resilience. While not PQC‑specific, it implicitly requires control and visibility over cryptographic assets and dependencies.

Bank of Canada payments oversight applies PFMI‑aligned standards to designated and prominent payment systems, requiring sound cyber and operational risk management across payment flows.

ASD / ACSC (and APRA for financials)

ASD/ACSC guidance on Planning for post‑quantum cryptography urges organisations to start preparation now, monitor ASD‑approved algorithms in the ISM, and carry out research, testing and trials - activities that presuppose a cryptographic inventory. The guidance explicitly discourages QKD for general secure communications in favour of standards‑based PQC.

APRA CPS 230 and CPS 234 require boards to ensure operational resilience and information security-driving asset mapping and third‑party control visibility that necessarily includes keys, certs, cipher suites, HSMs, PKI and crypto‑dependent services.



NZISM (GCSB / NCSC NZ)

NZISM v3.9 includes explicit guidance on Preparation for Post‑Quantum Cryptography, advising agencies to:
  • maintain an inventory of systems using public‑key cryptography
  • identify quantum‑vulnerable systems
  • prioritise by data value, longevity and dependencies
  • develop a migration plan

MAS & CSA

MAS Advisory explicitly recommends that institutions maintain an inventory of cryptographic assets, identify critical assets, and prioritise them for migration to quantum‑resistant solutions.
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Meet Encryption Intelligence

Encryption Intelligence is a SaaS platform that provides complete transparency into your organization's cryptographic dependencies - across networks, applications, cloud services, and third‑party integrations. It replaces guesswork with evidence.

Replace months of manual audit with automated, continuous scanning. Discover every cryptographic algorithm, certificate, key, and protocol in use - including those hidden in legacy systems and third‑party dependencies that manual processes consistently miss.

Choose Your Role

Demo by Role

See Encryption Intelligence through the lens that matters most to you.

CISO

Security Leadership

 

CIO

Technology Strategy

 

IT Ops

Infrastructure Teams

 

Consultants

Executive Reporting

 

Overview

Executive Reporting

CHOOSE YOUR ROLE

Demo by role

See Encryption Intelligence through the lens that matters most to you.

Comparison

Encryption Intelligence vs. Traditional Manual Audits

Capability Manual Audit Encryption Intelligence
Discovery scope Sampled, limited by resource Entire estate — networks, APIs, cloud, third-party
Time to inventory Weeks to months Hours to days
Accuracy Prone to human error and gaps Automated, consistent, auditable
Continuous monitoring Point-in-time snapshots only Real-time lifecycle tracking
CBOM generation Manual spreadsheet assembly Automated, NIST-aligned output
Regulatory alignment Requires interpretation Built-in NIS2 & NCSC mapping
Cost at scale Linear increase with estate size Scales efficiently through automation

Start with a Clear View

Your cryptographic estate contains vulnerabilities you haven't found yet. Our platform will show you exactly where they are - and what to do about them. 

Frequently Asked Questions

What is ACDI in cybersecurity? Automated Cryptographic Discovery and Inventory (ACDI) is the process of using automated tools to systematically identify, catalogue, and assess every cryptographic asset within an organisation's IT estate. This includes encryption algorithms, digital certificates, cryptographic keys, TLS/SSL configurations, and key exchange protocols across networks, applications, cloud services, and third‑party integrations.

Traditional approaches to cryptographic inventory rely on manual audits — a process that is time‑consuming, error‑prone, and typically limited in scope. ACDI replaces this with continuous, automated scanning that delivers a complete and accurate picture of an organisation's cryptographic posture.

In the context of post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) migration, ACDI is recognised as an essential first step. Organisations cannot plan a migration to quantum‑safe algorithms without first understanding what cryptographic assets they have, where they are deployed, and which are vulnerable to quantum attack. ACDI provides this foundational visibility.
What is a CBOM? A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) is a comprehensive, structured inventory of every cryptographic component used within an organisation's systems and applications. It functions similarly to a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) but is focused specifically on cryptographic assets — including algorithms, key lengths, certificate chains, protocol versions, and their dependencies.

The CBOM concept has gained significant importance in the context of NIST's Post‑Quantum Cryptography standardisation effort. As organisations prepare to transition from classical cryptographic algorithms (such as RSA and ECC) to quantum‑resistant alternatives (such as ML‑KEM and ML‑DSA), a CBOM provides the evidence base needed to plan, prioritise, and execute that migration.

For financial services organisations subject to regulations like DORA and NIS2, a CBOM also serves as a compliance artefact — demonstrating to auditors and regulators that the organisation has a clear understanding of its cryptographic dependencies and a documented plan for addressing quantum vulnerabilities.
What is Q‑Day? Q‑Day refers to the hypothetical future date on which a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) becomes operational — meaning it is capable of breaking the public‑key cryptographic algorithms that currently secure the vast majority of digital communications, financial transactions, and data storage.

Specifically, a CRQC would be able to execute Shor's algorithm at sufficient scale to break RSA, ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), and Diffie‑Hellman key exchange — the foundations of modern internet security. This would compromise TLS/SSL connections, digital signatures, PKI trust chains, and encrypted data stores.

The most immediate concern is the 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' (HNDL) threat: adversaries — including state‑level actors — are already intercepting and storing encrypted data today, with the intention of decrypting it once quantum computing capability becomes available. For financial services organisations, where data sensitivity can extend 20 years or more, this means that data encrypted today with quantum‑vulnerable algorithms is effectively already at risk.

Leading intelligence agencies and industry analysts place Q‑Day within the next 5 to 15 years, making it imperative for organisations to begin their transition to post‑quantum cryptography now.